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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A RULE C ARREST UNDER
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND AFTER SHAFFER V.
HEITNER
ARMEN R. VARTIAN*
INTRODUCTION

A collision occurs on the high seas off the coast of Portugal between a Greek-flag vessel and one flying the British flag. The Greek
ship is sailing from Italy to Holland, and the British ship is en route
from Ireland to Pakistan. The British ship sinks with the loss of all
cargo aboard, and the Greek ship limps into Portugal for repairs. Ten
months later, the Greek ship is on a voyage from Europe to Ontario
ports, and passes through the St. Lawrence Seaway. Although she remains at all times on the Canadian side of the channel, the ship must
transit the Eisenhower Locks, which by international agreement are
completely within the territorial waters of the United States. Prior to
this, the vessel had never before entered United States waters, nor had
her owner ever transacted business in the United States. While she is
in the locks, she is served by a United States Marshal with a warrant
of arrest obtained ex parte in a proceeding brought in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of New York by two
foreign owners of cargo aboard the ship with which she had collided
ten months earlier. Plaintiffs' action is in rem against the vessel under
Rule C of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime
Claims," and in personam against the shipowner.
* B.A., Brooklyn College of the City University of New York (1978); J.D., Harvard
University (1981); Editor-in-Chief, Harvard International Law Journal 1980-81. The author is currently Vice-President and General Counsel, Heritage Capital Corporation,
Dallas.
1. Rule C provides:
ACTIONS IN REM: SPECIAL PROVISIONS

(1) When available. An action in rem may be brought:
(a) To enforce any maritime lien;
(b) Whenever a statute of the United States provides for a maritime action
in rem or a proceeding analogous thereto.
Except as otherwise provided by law a party who may proceed in rem may
also, or in the alternative, proceed in personam against any person who may be
liable.
Statutory provisions exempting vessels or other property owned or possessed by or operated by or for the United States from arrest or seizure are not
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Under the law as interpreted by several courts and commentators,
affected by this rule. When a statute so provides, an action against the United
States or an instrumentality thereof may proceed on in rem principles.
(2) Complaint. In actions in rem the complaint shall be verified on oath or
solemn affirmation. It shall describe with reasonable particularity the property
that is the subject of the action and state that it is within the district or will be
during the pendency of the action. In actions for the enforcement of forfeitures
for violation of any statute of the United States the complaint shall state the
place of seizure and whether it was on land or on navigable waters, and shall
contain such allegations as may be required by the statute pursuant to which the
action is brought.
(3) Judicial Authorization and Process. Except in actions by the United
States for forfeitures for federal statutory violations, the verified complaint and
any supporting papers shall be reviewed by the court and, if the conditions for
an action in rem appear to exist, an order so stating and authorizing a warrant
for the arrest of the vessel or other property that is the subject of the action
shall issue and be delivered to the clerk who shall prepare the warrant and deliver it to the marshal for service. If the property that is the subject of the action
consists in whole or in part of freight, or the proceeds of property sold, or other
intangible property, the clerk shall issue a summons directing any person having
control of the funds to show cause why they should not be paid into court to
abide the judgment. Supplemental process enforcing the court's order may be
issued by the clerk upon application without further order of the court. If the
plaintiff or his attorney certifies that exigent circumstances make review by the
court impracticable, the clerk shall issue a summons and warrant for the arrest
and the plaintiff shall have the burden on a post-arrest hearing under Rule
E(4)(f to show that exigent circumstances existed. In actions by the United
States for forfeitures for federal statutory violations, the clerk, upon filing of the
complaint, shall forthwith issue a summons and warrant for the arrest of the
vessel or other property without requiring a certification of exigent
circumstances.
(4) Notice. No notice other than the execution of the process is required
when the property that is the subject of the action has been released in accordance with Rule E(5). If the property is not released within 10 days after execution of process, the plaintiff shall promptly or within such time as may be allowed by the court cause public notice of the action and arrest to be given in a
newspaper of general circulation in the district, designated by order of the court.
Such notice shall specify the time within which the answer is required to be filed
as provided by subdivision (6) of this rule. This rule does not affect the requirements of notice in actions to foreclose a preferred ship mortgage pursuant to the
Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, § 30, as amended.
(5) Ancillary Process. In any action in rem in which process has been served
as provided by this rule, if any part of the property that is the subject of the
action has not been brought within the control of the court because it has been
removed or sold, or because it is intangible property in the hands of a person
who has not been served with process, the court may, on motion, order any person having possession or control of such property or its proceeds to show cause
why it should not be delivered into the custody of the marshal or paid into court
to abide the judgment; and, after hearing, the court may enter such judgment as
law and justice may require.
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no objection to the assertion of in rem jurisdiction over the vessel or in
personam jurisdiction over her owner would lie under the scenario described above, despite the jurisdictional due process doctrine of "minimum contacts" developed by the Supreme Court from International
Shoe Co. v. Washington" through Shaffer v. Heitner3 and World-Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson." Various rationales have been used to explain
the relationship between this broad interpretation of Rule C jurisdiction and the Due Process Clause, including: 1) that Rule C arrests fall
within the "exceptions" relating to in rem actions set out expressly in
Shaffer; 2) that the doctrine of "personification" of vessels makes a
vessel's presence in the forum satisfactory to confer jurisdiction; 3)
that the presence of the vessel in a forum constitutes "doing business"
in the forum; 4) that the doctrine of "foreseeability" makes jurisdiction
proper where vessels call in the forum with knowledge and consent of
the shipowner; 5) that "necessity" requires assertion of jurisdiction
where no other United States forum is available, and 6) that the "autonomy of admiralty" from actions at law under article III of the Constitution, and centuries of practice, makes the Shaffer doctrines
inapplicable.5
This article will analyze the above rationales, and conclude that
they are not sufficient to justify an assertion of jurisdiction over the
(6) Claim and Answer; Interrogatories. The claimant of property that is the
subject of an action in rem shall file his claim within 10 days after process has
been executed, or within such additional time as may be allowed by the court,
and shall serve his answer within 20 days after the filing of the claim. The claim
shall be verified on oath or solemn affirmation, and shall state the interest in the
property by virtue of which the claimant demands its restitution and the right to
defend the action. If the claim is made on behalf of the person entitled to possession by an agent, bailee, or attorney, it shall state that he is duly authorized
to make the claim. At the time of answering the claimant shall also serve answers to any interrogatories served with the complaint. In actions in rem interrogatories may be so served without leave of court.
FED. R. Civ. P., ADMIRALTY Supp. RULE C.
2. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
4. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
5. See, e.g., Bohmann, Applicability of Shaffer to Admiralty in Rem Jurisdiction,53
TUL. L. REV. 135 (1978). This is the most comprehensive prior treatment of the subject.
Other articles have included discussions of the effect of Shaffer on Rule C arrests. See
Batiza & Partridge, The ConstitutionalChallenge to Maritime Seizures, 26 Loy. L. REv.
203 (1980); McNamara, The Constitutionalityof Maritime Attachment, 12 J. MAarr. L.
& COMM. 97, 107 n.88 (1980); Olsen, Jurisdiction in Admiralty: Pennoyer v. Neff in
Ship's Clothing?, 84 DICK. L. REV. 395, 404-13 (1980); Schwartz, Due Process and Traditional Admiralty Arrest and Attachment Under the Supplemental Rules, 8 MARrr. LAW,
229, 259-62 (1983); Note, Constitutionality of Admiralty Arrest and Attachments Pursuant to Supplemental Rules B and C, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 421, 447-53 (1979).
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defendants in the hypothetical situation. The article will argue that in
in rem actions the Due Process Clause requires an examination of a
shipowner's contacts with the forum. This requirement, however, will
be satisfied if there are "minimum aggregate contacts" between the
vessel, or her owner(s), and the United States.'

I. DIscUSSION
A.

Shaffer "Exceptions"

It has been argued that the admiralty in rem action falls within
two "exceptions" which were set forth expressly in Shaffer. The first of
these so-called exceptions is the situation in which "claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the
plaintiff and the defendant."'7 The second exception is "where the defendant's ownership of the property is conceded but the cause of action
is otherwise related to rights and duties growing out of that ownership." The argument is that because maritime liens (that is, claims
against the vessels) are "in the nature of a property interest," ownership of the property is the source of disputes in in rem actions, or,
alternatively, such disputes concern rights and duties incident to that
ownership.9
This argument misconstrues Shaffer as well as the nature of maritime liens. It is clear from the passage in Shaffer, from which these
6. Another aspect of due process, that of protecting defendants against unjust deprivations of their property, has led some courts to strike down Rule C arrests because of
their failure to provide for prior judicial review or post-arrest hearings. See Sniadach v.
Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974). This issue has been the subject of a great deal of
scholarly attention, see supra note 5; Morse, The Conflict Between the Supreme Court
Admiralty Rules and Sniadach-Fuentes: A Collision Course?, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 1
(1975); Robol, Admiralty's Adjudicatory JurisdictionOver Alien Defendants: A Functional Analysis, 11 J. MAurr. L. & COMM. 395 (1980), and has led to amendments of Rule
C. The amendments do not affect the Shaffer issue and are beyond the scope of this
article.
7. 433 U.S. at 207.
8. Id. at 208.
9. See A/S Hjalmar Bjorges Rederi v. Tug Boat Condor, 1979 A.M.C. 1691, 1699
(S.D. Cal. 1979) (analogy to quiet title action); Maritime Law Ass'n, Special Report of
Committee on Practice and Procedure on Admiralty Arrest and Attachment Rules,
M.L.A. Doc. 610, Nov. 4, 1977, at 6780-81. See also Ove Skou R/A v. Atlantic Mut. Ins.
Co., No. 80 Civ. 6727 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist.
file): "Since plaintiff cannot assert its claim in rem as within the Admiralty jurisdiction
of this Court, this case does not qualify as one where 'claims to the property itself are
the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant.
(quoting Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207).
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exceptions are derived, that the type of property being considered was
real property, or at the very least, non-transitory property: "The
State's strong interest in assuring the marketability of property within
its borders and in providing a procedure for peaceful resolution of disputes about the possession of that property would also support jurisdiction, as would the likelihood that important records and witnesses
will be found in the State."10 A vessel that is in the jurisdiction only to
call and then to depart does not represent the type of property that
would create contacts sufficient to satisfy the Court's suggestion that
"it would be unusual for the State where the property is located not to
have jurisdiction."'" Indeed, as discussed below,"2 the courts have held
that the presence of a vessel in a particular jurisdiction, without more,
is not sufficient to satisfy the "minimum contacts" requirement. Moreover, the nature of a maritime lien is not such that an enforcement
action could be considered a dispute concerning ownership of the property. As stated by Gilmore and Black:
The maritime lienor is not a co-owner of the ship. He has no
right to control the ship's use or movements in any way. It remains the owner's ship for all purposes-subject to the lienor's
right to have it arrested, wherever he can find it, on process
13
issuing from the admiralty court.
433 U.S. at 208.
Id. at 207. See also Bohmann, supra note 5, at 147 (citations omitted):
[Tlhe Court gave as an example the case where an absentee landowner is
sued for injuries suffered on his land. In such a case the attached property is a
fixed asset-the land. Since the asset is fixed, it is easier to assert that the defendant-landowner has invoked the benefit and protection of the laws of the
state where the land is located. A ship, on the other hand, is not fixed. It can
move from place to place and indeed relies on this movement for its profitability. Hence, it is more difficult to say that the ship's owner has availed himself of
the benefits and protections of the laws of any given place where the ship happens to be.

10.
11.

Id.
12. See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
13. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 9-2, at 588 (2d ed. 1978). Ove
Skou R/A v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., No. 80-6727 slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1981) (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) illustrates some of the confusion in this area.
After ruling that in rem jurisdiction was not available, the court held that "[t]he jurisdiction which plaintiff seeks to assert is therefore 'jurisdiction over the interests of persons
in a thing,'" which must be based on InternationalShoe minimum contacts. Id. This
suggests that admiralty in rem jurisdiction does not adjudicate the interests of persons,
directly contrary to the suggestion in Shaffer itself. As Judge C. Clyde Atkins pointed
out in a Southern District of Florida case:
It seems probable that Shaffer will not be extended in the near future to
true in rem proceedings, and that the often maligned-but still extant-ship
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The fact that a maritime lien is a form of property right does not mean
that an arrest procedure is an action where the ownership of property,
or the rights and duties growing out of that ownership, are in dispute. 4
In most in rem arrest cases, moreover, the vessel is released
shortly after the arrest in return for the shipowner offering substitute
security, usually in the form of a bond. Clearly, the ownership of the
vessel is not at issue in such a case. The arrest is used simply as a
security device, and once substitute security has been obtained, the
vessel itself is no longer involved in the action.'5 Likewise, if substitute
personification theory will suffice to confer true in rem jurisdiction on the Court
having control over the offending res regardless of the contacts its owner may
have with that district.
P.C. Int'l Inc. v. Susan, 1980 A.M.C. 2062, 2066 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (quoting 7A J. MooRE,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

§ E.10 (2d ed. 1984)).

14. The argument has been made that because an in rem proceeding adjudicates the
rights of all lienors worldwide, applying Shaffer to such a proceeding would be impossible; the likelihood being slim that all "interested parties" would have "minimum contacts" with the forum. See Note, Maritime Attachment and Arrest: Facing a Jurisdictional and Procedural Due Process Attack, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 153, 166 (1978). Of
course, the shipowner who stands to lose his vessel is more "interested" than a lienor
whose in personam claim against the owner is unaffected by the sale or even destruction
of the vessel. Requiring minimum contacts between the forum and owner, and not between the forum and lienors, is perfectly understandable.
15. An interesting point is raised by Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364
U.S. 19 (1959). The plaintiff sued a vessel in rem, and its owner in personam, for cargo
damage. Before the vessel could be arrested, however, the owner tendered a letter of
undertaking in which he agreed to appear on behalf of the vessel and pay any judgment
against her, in consideration for the plaintiff's refraining from arrest and not requiring a
bond. Id. at 29 (Whittaker, J., dissenting). The primary issue in the case was whether 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a) permitted transfer of the in rem action to a forum in which the vessel
had not been present. See infra text accompanying notes 35-40. The majority of the
Court treated the letter of undertaking implicitly as one ground for merging the in rem
action into the in personamn action for transfer purposes. See id. at 26-27. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, would have relied solely on the letter to justify transfer. Id. at 27.
Justice Whittaker, dissenting, took another view:
The Barge itself being the "offending thing," and here being itself subject to
suit, and having been sued, in rem, we think it may not be said that the giving
by respondent, Federal Barge Lines, Inc., and the acceptance by petitioner, of
the "letter undertaking," to prevent the physical arrest of the Barge, converted
the in rem action into one in personam. . . . This Court has from an early day
consistently held that a bond, given to prevent the arrest or to procure the release of a vessel, is substitutedfor and stands as the vessel in the custody of the
court.
Id. at 38 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Justice Whittaker relied on an admiralty fiction which is ancient, but a fiction nonetheless. Vessels do not give bonds, owners do. The security for a judgment comes from
the owner. In theory, a bond or undertaking could be set up when the vessel is thousands
of miles away from its next United States destination. In such cases the plaintiff's inter-
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security is not offered, the vessel is sold and proceeds are then distributed to satisfy the plaintiffs claim. This is not the type of relationship,
between res and forum, which Shaffer indicated would be constitutionally required for in rem jurisdiction."
B. Personification
The "ship personification" concept was described by the Fifth Circuit majority in Merchants Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Dredge General
G.L. Gillespie:17 "[j]urisdiction is asserted over the vessel under the
same circumstances that jurisdiction could be asserted over an individual." s Thus, since in an in rem action the vessel is a defendant, service
upon it in the forum confers the same jurisdiction as would service on
an individual.
Commentators have noted that there is great confusion as to
whether an in rem claim against the vessel actually adjudicates the
rights of the owner of the vessel. 19 The Supreme Court in Shaffer
stated, in the context of civil in rem actions: "The fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports an ancient form without substantial modern justification. Its continued acceptance would
east is clearly not in the vessel itself, but in "owner's pocket," id. at 26, from which all
judgments will be paid.
16. See Olsen, supra note 5, at 405:
Property is, in theory, inanimate. "It" could not care who owns, conveys,
leases, libels, or attaches their legal interest in it. The business of jurisdiction,
however, is animate. It concerns the measuring and balancing in constitutional
terms, of the relative convenience of parties involved in the controversy of trying
a lawsuit one place as opposed to another. To the extent that the presence of
certain property in a forum fits into this determination, it is relevant; otherwise,
Shafer seems to say, it is not.

Id.
17. 663 F.2d 1338, 1350 n.18 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 966 (1982).
18. Id. at 1350 n.18. No Shaffer issue was raised by the parties, so the majority's
statement is dictum. See also 663 F.2d at 1351 (Tate, J., dissenting).
19. See, e.g., Batiza & Partridge, supra note 5, at 239-40:
It is more difficult. . . to assess the impact of Shaffer and the SniadachFuentes line of cases on Rule C, because of the confusing dual role of the vessel
under Rule C as both person and thing . . . . The personification of the vessel
theory, however, does not obscure the fact that vessels are also owned by people
who are to be protected by the Constitution from the mistaken deprivation of
their property. The fact that Rule C performs two functions (jurisdiction and
security) and the fact that the vessel plays two roles (person and thing seized)
hampers the application of due process guidelines and makes it difficult to predict the direction of future decisions concerning both Shaffer and SniadachFuentes challenges.
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serve only to allow state court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair
to the defendant.""' The argument justifying the "personification" fiction in admiralty is two-fold. The first part is based on the distinction
between maritime liens in the United States and those in the United
Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, maritime liens are devices by which
the shipowner is induced to appear in personam to defend the action."1
In the United States, however, a maritime lien is conceived of as a
right against the vessel itself, enforceable against the vessel by sale and
distribution of proceeds.12 The second part of the argument is that although the shipowner might have the right under the Due Process
Clause not to have his property seized except by a court in a jurisdiction with "minimum contacts," the vessel itself as defendant cannot
assert such a right, because it is the property that is being seized' s
Neither component of the argument is persuasive. A maritime lien
in the United States carries with it only the right to proceed against
the vessel in accordance with the procedure set forth by the federal
rules, including sale of the vessel and distribution of proceeds. It does
not authorize a court without jurisdiction to entertain a suit simply
because it is an in rem admiralty action. 24 Thus, when the bases of
jurisdiction are narrowed, it is perfectly logical to say that the bases for
enforcement of maritime liens will be correspondingly narrowed." The
nature of the maritime lien, therefore, has no effect on the question of
jurisdiction.
20. 433 U.S. at 212. See also id. at 207 n.22, quoting Tyler v. Court of Registration,
175 Mass. 71, 76, 55 N.E. 812, 814 (Holmes, C.J.), appeal dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900)
("All proceedings like all rights, are really against persons. Whether they are proceedings
or rights in rem depends on the number of persons affected.").
21. See, e.g., GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 13, at 589-90.
22. Id. See also Claimants of the Brig Malek Adhel v. United States, 43 U.S. (2
How.) 210, 233 (1844).
23. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. S/T Valiant King, 1977 A.M.C. 1719, 1721 (E.D. Pa.
1974): ("[It is difficult to understand how a res or thing which is itself the 'property' can
allege that it has been deprived of its property without due process of law." Id.) (emphasis in the original).
Batiza & Partridge, supra note 5, agree, suggesting that application of Shaffer to in
rem seizure leads to this "logical conundrum." Id. at 228-30.
24. For a discussion of the statutory basis for "minimum aggregate contacts, see infra
notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
25. See Olsen, supra note 5, at 406:
[Tihe long pedigree [of admiralty in rem seizure] seems to foreclose contemporary inquiry. The problem now, however, is that contemporary constitutional
standards seem to dictate just such an inquiry, despite how impolite that traditionalists may think it to be. The historical pedigree of admiralty jurisdiction is,
in this respect, of no importance, and one cannot doubt that analysis of the in
rem libel under the Shaffer standard, is therefore, imminent.
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Similarly, the argument that property itself has no rights would
seem to be precisely'the sort of argument that the Supreme Court rejected in Shaffer. The Court stated: "'Traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice' can be as readily offended by the perpetuation
of ancient forms that are no longer justified as by the adoption of new
procedures that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage. ' 20 It is impossible to adjudicate the rights of a vessel
without simultaneously adjudicating the rights of its owner. " Although
there are instances when a vessel may be liable in rem and its owner
not liable in personam," s those few instances certainly do not justify
the application, generally, of a rule ignoring the rights of shipowners
with respect to in rem claims against their vessels."1 The constitutional
underpinning for Rule C must be found elsewhere.30
This point is well made in Karl Senner, Inc. v. M/V Acadian
Valor,' in which the court stated, with respect to in rem claims joined
to in personam ones: "Courts have time and again acknowledged the
personification theory to be a fiction whose real value is simply as a
mechanism to enforce the in personam liability of the owner. 3' 2 In re26. 433 U.S. at 212.
27. See id. at 207:
The case for applying to jurisdiction in rem the same test of "fair play, and
substantial justice" as governs assertions of jurisdiction in personam is simple
and straightforward. It is premised on recognition that "[tihe phrase, 'judicial
jurisdiction over a thing,' is a customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction
over the interests of persons in a thing".
Id. See also Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Dredge General G.L. Gillespie, 663 F.2d 1338, 1353
(5th Cir. 1981) (Tate, J., dissenting).
In Ove Skou R/A v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., No. 80-6727, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7,
1981), plaintiff sought to attach, under Rule C, a trust fund which had been established
by a cargo owner as security for a general average claim by the shipowner. Plaintiff's
intention was to thereby obtain jurisdiction in rem against the fund. The court ruled
that no in rem action against the fund was available, and that, consequently, "[t]he jurisdiction which plaintiff seeks to assert is therefore 'jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing' and must be based on contacts sufficient to serve as a predicate for in
personam jurisdiction under [InternationalShoe]. The fund here cannot in itself serve
as a substitute for such contacts." Id.
28. See, e.g., The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53 (1868) (owner not liable in personam for
negligence of compulsory pilot; however, in rem suit against vessel will lie).
29. See Olsen, supra note 5, at 409.
30. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text. In Continental Grain Co. v. Barge
FBL-535, 364 U.S. 19 (1960), Justice Whittaker, in dissent, questioned whether the
owner of a vessel sued in rem could consent to jurisdiction in a particular forum, Id. at
39.
31. 485 F. Supp. 287 (E.D. La. 1980).
32. Id. at 292-93 (citation omitted). See also G. GiLMoRE & C. BLACK, supra note 13, §
9-18, at 616.
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33
viewing the decision in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. SIT Valiant King,
the Karl Senner court stated:

The Bethlehem Court had difficulty in understanding "how a
res or thing which is itself the 'property' can allege that it has
been deprived of its property without due process of law." [citation omitted] But that Court refused to consider the personification theory which transforms a vessel into a legal person for
jurisdictional purposes. Inasmuch as the creation of that legal
person endows the Courts with power over it, that power must
34
be exercised as it would be exercised over other legal persons.
The issue was considered by the Supreme Court in Continental
Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585.85 That case involved the partial sinking of
a vessel in Memphis, with damage to her cargo. The shipowner sued
the cargo shipper in Tennessee, claiming that the sinking was due to
negligent loading by the shipper. The shipper, meanwhile, had sued
the shipowner in personam and the vessel in rem in Louisiana, the vessel being located there at the time of the suit. The shipowner moved
for transfer of the case to Tennessee under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), 3' and
the motion was granted by the lower court, over the shipper's objection
that section 1404(a) was unavailable because the in rem action could
not have been brought originally in Tennessee.
The Supreme Court affirmed, the majority stating that although
in
rem action could only have been brought in the district where
the
the vessel was located, apart from the fiction of personification, both
the in rem and in personam actions were really against the shipowner,
and the shipowner was subject to suit in Tennessee.17 After reviewing a
33. 1977 A.M.C. 1719 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
34. 485 F. Supp. at 294. In Karl Senner there was no question that personal jurisdiction existed over the shipowner with respect to the plaintiff's in personam claim. The
plaintiff arrested the vessel solely for security purposes. This fact has been given great
significance in one commentary on the case, see Batiza & Partridge, supra note 5, at 23435. Its impact, however, was simply to make unnecessary an analysis of the troubling
question whether the vessel as a juridicial person may assert due process rights on behalf
of itself and its owner.
35. 364 U.S. at 22-23.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) states: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought." Id.
Under Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960), which pre-dated Continental Grain
by two weeks, transfer under Section 1404(a) was improper, when, at the time of suit,
defendant could not have been sued in the transferee court.
37. 364 U.S. at 26-27. To emphasize the point the Court noted: "the grain company's
suit against the barge and its suit against the owner are in the same complaint for the
loss of the same cargo in the same sinking of the same barge producing the same dam-

19861

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RULE C ARREST

line of authorities wherein the Court had treated in rem and in personam actions in admiralty as essentially the same,3" the Court
declared:
Although the action in New Orleans was technically brought
against the barge itself as well as its owner, the obvious fact is
that, whatever other advantages may result, this is an alternative way of bringing the owner into court. And although any
judgment for the cargo owner will be technically enforceable
against the barge as an entity as well as its owner, the practical
economic fact of the matter is that the money paid in satisfaction of it will have to come out of the barge owner's
pocket-including the possibility of a levy upon the barge even
had the cargo owner not prayed for "personified" in rem relief.
The crucial issues about fault and damages suffered were identical, whether considered as a claim against the ship or its
owner. The witnesses were identical. Thus, while two methods
were invoked to bring the owner into court and enforce any
judgment against it, the substance of what had to be done to
adjudicate the rights of the parties was not different at all."
The case, therefore, although not settling the question (and preceding
Shaffer by seventeen years), suggests that the "personification" con40
cept may be without modern justification.
ages." Id. at 22.
38. Id. at 23-24. See The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468, 503 (1886):
To say that an owner is not liable, but that his vessel is liable, seems to us
like talking in riddles. A man's liability for a demand against him is measured by
the amount of the property that may be taken from him to satisfy that demand.
In the matter of liability, a man and his property cannot be separated ....
Id. See also Consumers Import Co. v. Kabushiki Kaisha Kawasaki Zosenjo, 320 U.S. 249,
253 (1943):
Congress has said that the owner shall not "answer for" this loss in question. Claimant says this means in effect that he shall answer only with his ship.
But the owner would never answer for a loss except with his property, since
execution against the body was not at any time in legislative contemplation.
There could be no practical exoneration of the owner that did not at the same
time exempt his property.
Id.
39. 364 U.S. at 26.
40. See also Bunge Corp. v. M/T Stolt Hippo, 1980 A.M.C. 2611 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), in
which an action for short/damaged cargo was brought in rem against the vessel and in
personam against the shipowner. Owner moved for a stay pending arbitration, and the
court granted the stay based on a charter party arbitration clause incorporated into
cargo's bill of lading. Cargo contended that the in rem action was not affected by the
arbitration clause nor, consequently, by the stay. The court disagreed, stating that
"courts frequently order a stay in an action pending arbitration without allowing the suit
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C. Doing Business
It has been said in the past that jurisdiction over a manufacturer
or retailer may be established under a "doing business" rationale if
that manufacturer/retailer's goods should happen to find their way into
the jurisdiction, even without the manufacturer/retailer's knowledge.
This theory has been rejected recently by the courts, based on the notion that a defendant does not "appoint [its] chattel his agent for service of process,"" and the presence of a defendant's goods in a particular jurisdiction, unknown to the manufacturer/retailer, does not by
itself constitute the sort of significant contact with that jurisdiction
which would subject the defendant to jurisdiction under the "substantial justice and fair play" standard of InternationalShoe.
The theory sometimes employed in the case of a defendant-vessel,
however, is that it is an income-producing instrumentality of the shipowner, and that the shipowner is present-in terms of "doing business"-wherever his vessel calls. "'
It is difficult to justify this line of thinking. Where the vessel itself
is the only contact with the jurisdiction, it is unfair for the defendantvessel to be subjected to unlimited personal jurisdiction."3 In the case
of real property, the property is continuously within the jurisdiction,
and the contacts between the property and the forum are necessarily
more significant. Without more, the mere presence of a vessel within
to proceed simultaneously against a vessel nominally a party to the lawsuit." Id. at 2616.
This case flirts with the "personification" fiction, but the true concept of personification
would have required the vessel's rights and liabilities to be determined independently of
those of the shipowner. Because vessels cannot sign arbitration agreements, they cannot
assert rights to arbitrate against others. Owner, in effect, petitioned for a stay on behalf
of his vessel. The fact that it was granted may indicate only a desire by the court for
judicial efficiency. It certainly suggests, however, that in rem and in personam claims can
be merged procedurally, despite the "personification" of the vessel.
41. 444 U.S. at 296.
42. See Bohmann, supra note 5, at 142.
43. Although it could be argued that the in rem claim is limited in practical terms to
the proceeds of the vessel upon sale, and not truly "unlimited," the vessel is nevertheless
an extremely valuable commodity, and the jurisdiction against it must be constrained by
principles applicable to in personam jurisdiction. See, e.g., 433 U.S. at 207 n.23 (1977):
It is true that the potential liability of a defendant in an in rem action is
limited by the value of the property, but that limitation does not affect the argument. The fairness of subjecting a defendant to state court jurisdiction does not
depend on the size of the claim being litigated.
Id.
In addition, on the basis of recent cases, it has been stated that the limitation rule is
"breaking down," with courts issuing in personam judgments against owners in in rem
cases in which those owners were not even served with process. See GILMORE & BLACK,
supra note 13, at 802-805.
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the jurisdiction is not sufficient to satisfy the "minimum contacts" requirement of Shaffer."
Indeed, several courts have so held. In Grevas v. M/V Olympic
Pegasus,4 in rem and in personam actions were brought in Virginia for
personal injury, service being made under the Virginia long-arm statute. The district court concluded that the defendant's contacts with
Virginia were insufficient to maintain service of process under the Virginia long-arm statute. The court noted that the defendant's sole contact with Virginia was the visit of its vessel Olympic Pegasus for a period of eight days, during which the vessel had loaded a cargo, taken on
water, had its propeller inspected, and signed on a new crew member.
The court stated: "These few activities deriving from a single visit of
the vessel to Virginia do not amount to contacts sufficient to subject
defendant to in personam jurisdiction in Virginia under [the long-arm
statute] .46
44. Judge Schwartz of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana notes that "the presence of a vessel and most sets of facts which would give
rise to a maritime lien would seem to provide ample contacts with a jurisdiction."
Schwartz, supra note 5, at 260-62. This statement may be correct, although it assumes
that the lienor is American and that the vessel had called in the United States previously. It begs the question, however, because for purposes of analysis the due process
challenge must be assumed to come from an entity with few contacts with the forum. See
supra hypothetical p. 1.
45. 557 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1977).
46. Id. at 68. A report of the Maritime Law Association has stated that personal jurisdiction over a shipowner will be found under InternationalShoe: "[ilf a ship enters a
port of the United States, except as a port of refuge, to do business there." Maritime
Law Ass'n, supra note 9, at 6781. ("In most situations, shipowners, charterers and cargo
interests who send their vessels and/or cargo into a given port will be considered to be
'doing business' there, thus submitting themselves to the state's long arm jurisdiction.")
Id. at 6786 n.1.
These statements, and the decisions cited in support thereof, evince a misunderstanding of the applicable law, and of the term "doing business."
For purposes of state long-arm jurisdiction, "doing business" generally requires a
"systematic and continuous" relationship between defendant and the forum. See, e.g.,
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). The Olympic Pegasus decision is perfectly consistent with the doctrine in this area, as expounded by the Supreme
Court. In fact, the recent decision in Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408 (1984), reflects a further expansion by the Court of the scope of protections
afforded to defendants by the Due Process Clause. In Helicopteros, a foreign helicopter
line was sued in Texas as a result of a crash of one of its helicopters in Columbia. Defendant had purchased helicopters and parts in Texas for many years, had trained its
pilots and management personnel in Texas, consulted on technical matters in Texas, and
had negotiated in Texas the contract, during the performance of which the crash took
place. These contacts were held insufficient under InternationalShoe.
Of course, if the cause of action arises out of even a single contact in the forum,
jurisdiction may be asserted. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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If the contacts are substantial and/or frequent enough, however,
4
the "doing business" standard will be met. In Nesset v. Christensen,
a vessel owned by a single-ship corporation had made fourteen calls to
New York in seventeen months, all while on time charter. A personal
injury action was brought against the shipowner. The defendant contended that the contacts with New York were insufficient under InterThus, the Second Circuit has held that a vessel/owner may be sued for cargo damage in
the port of discharge. Aquascutum of London, Inc. v. S.S. American Champion, 426 F.2d
205, 209 (2d Cir. 1970); Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha, Ltd. v. M.S. Galini, 323 F. Supp. 79
(S.D. Tex. 1971) (suit brought at loadport where cargo damage arose from contaminated
grain feeders on vessel). This doctrine would seem to apply as well to in rem actions,
provided the activities giving rise to the lien occurred in the forum. Cf. Gkiafis v. S.S.
Yiosanas, 342 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1965).
For an example of a vessel entering the forum only as a port of refuge, see United
States v. Tug Parris Island, 215 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.C. 1963).
On the other hand, it has been said that where a ship is the only or primary asset of
a shipowner, the shipowner may be said to be "doing business" wherever his ship may
go. In Gkiafis, 342 F.2d 546, the cause of action was for personal injury suffered while
the vessel was calling at Baltimore. The court found that the only contacts between the
defendant and Maryland were six "unscheduled visits" by the vessel over a period of
nine years. The ship was a tramp steamer and defendant owned no other vessels. The
court looked at the quality of defendant's contact with Maryland and the relationship
between the contact and the cause of action. On the first point the court ruled that,
because defendant owned only one ship when that ship entered Maryland, the respondent was doing all of its business there. Id. at 556; accord, Szabo v. Smedvig TankRederi A.S.P., 95 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) ("the defendant's sole business consists
of the operation of the vessel on which plaintiff was injured and one other, and so it
would appear that a very substantial portion of.its business and activities is carried on
for and on behalf of defendant within this state.").
The court implied that had the vessel belonged to a shipowner with a large fleet,
that shipowner would not have been deemed to be doing business in Maryland. The
court noted that "while in Maryland the ship loaded or unloaded valuable cargoes and
the owner supplied sizable quantities of fuel and stores, hired tugs and contracted for
berths. The visits were thus significant both to the respondent and to the state." Second,
the court seemed to be saying that because the injury occurred while the vessel was in
Maryland, the case satisfied the requirement of McGee, 355 U.S. 220, which held that a
single contact with the forum state is sufficient if that contact gives rise to the cause of
action involved in the suit. Finally, the court rejected the argument that a tramp
steamer's contacts with a port were insufficient because its stops were not scheduled,
quoting from the opinion of the Supreme Court of North Carolina in State Highway and
Public Works Comm'n. v. Diamond S.S. Transp. Corp., 225 N.C. 198, 34 S.E.2d 978, 981
(1945), the Gkiafis court stated:
Under the construction of the statutes contended for by the appellant, the
Severence might ply its trade in every port from Seattle to Bangor and back
again, leaving a trail of obligations in its wake, and never "do business" in any
state, or become subject to any statute designed to bring it into court upon that
basis.
342 F.2d at 557.
47. 92 F. Supp. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1950).
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national Shoe, because inter alia, the vessel was on charter and its
ports of call were determined by the time charterer. The court rejected
this argument, stating that such matters as provisions, wages, stores,
hiring and discharging crew, and maintaining the vessel were all the
owner's responsibility under the time charter, and "[i]t is reasonable to
assume, since the N/[SS] Hermund was engaged in transatlantic trips
rather than in short coastal traffic, that these activities required the
owner's attention when the vessel called at the Port of New York."4
The court also emphasized that the vessel was owned by the defendant, and that fourteen calls to New York within a period of seventeen
months "can be regarded as establishing4 9 a regular pattern of visits
rather than irregular or haphazard calls.

Nevertheless, the point is that the conventional "minimum contacts" analysis has been applied to vessels calling in particular forums,
and it is appropriate to do so.
D. Foreseeability
As noted above, a nonresident foreign corporation does not appoint its products as "agents for service of process wherever they go.""
A vessel, however, bears a different relationship to its owner than does
a product to its manufacturer. To the extent that a shipowner directs
or is aware of the vessel's movements, he might foresee suit in any
forum in which the vessel calls. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court
stated:
It is foreseeable that the purchasers of automobiles sold by
World-Wide and Seaway may take them to Oklahoma. But the
mere "unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship
with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of
contact with the forum State."51
This principle is applicable to a purchaser who transports the product-after sale-without the knowledge or consent of the manufacturer/retailer. It should not be applicable, however, in the case of a
vessel whose location is always known to its owner, because the "uni48. Id. at 82.
49. Id. See also Cook Indus. Inc. v. Tokyo Marine Co. Ltd., 1978 A.M.C. 1979 (D.
Alaska 1978) (four calls in six months prior to suit, with contract lasting another six
months, sufficient); Murphy v. Int'l Freighting Corp., 182 F. Supp. 204 (D. Mass. 1960),
afl'd sub nom. Murphy v. A/S Sobral, 283 F.2d 392 (1st Cir. 1960) (eight calls in two
years sufficient); Murphy v. Arrow S.S. Co., 124 F. Supp. 199 (E.D. Pa. 1954) (seven calls
in four years preceding suit, including three calls in previous year sufficient).
50. See supra text accompanying note 41.
51. 444 U.S. at 298 (citation omitted).
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lateral activity" aspect is not present.
On the other hand, if the vessel is under bareboat charter or longterm time charter, the charterer of the vessel will control its movements, subject only to geographical range limitations in the charter
party. Thus, a vessel will find itself in a particular port with the
owner's knowledge, but without the owner's express consent. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen considered
this fact possibility, but the reasoning of the decision is such that an
owner should not be held to submit to personal jurisdiction when the
presence of the vessel is not at the owner's instance, and the claim does
not arise out of the presence of the vessel in that particular forum.'.
Moreover, "forseeability" is not an exception to the minimum contacts doctrine. A company which trades knowingly in 100 countries
cannot be held to consent to jurisdiction in all of them simply because
of those trades. A fortiori, a foreign company should not be required to
defend in the United States an action by a foreign claimant simply
because its vessel is in the United States. To say such a suit is "foreseeable" is somewhat circular; and moreover it ignores the greater
52. See Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981). The case concerned an oil spill off the coast of
Puerto Rico. Defendants included the vessel in rein, its owner and the insurance underwriters-West of England Shipowner's Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association.
The club contended that personal jurisdiction was lacking over it, arguing that WorldWide Volkswagen required more than mere "foreseeability." 628 F.2d at 669. The court
distinguished World-Wide Volkswagen:
[T]he seller of a product such as the automobile in [World-Wide Volkswagen] ordinarily has no control over where the buyer takes the product after it
is sold. If the mere fortuity of the presence of the seller's product in another
jurisdiction subjected the seller to suit in that forum, the seller "would in effect
appoint the chattel his agent for service of process. His amenability to suit
would travel with the chattel." By contrast, an insurer such as West of England
has the power through its contracts of insurance meaningfully to influence the
course taken by insured vessels. By limiting coverage to specified jurisdictions,
West of England could be reasonably certain it would not be haled into court in
an undesired forum. In other words, an insurer is not at the mercy of the insured
owner's unilateral choice of destination in the same way a seller of chattels is at
the mercy of the buyer.
Id. at 669-70.
In Zoe Colocotroni, of course, the cause of action arose as a result of the vessel's
presence in the forum, Puerto Rico, which happens to be a "direct action" jurisdiction.
The court's analysis, nevertheless, is problematic because it broadens the scope of forseeability so far as to suggest that an international operator must restrict indirect business contacts in an almost impossible way simply to avoid jurisdiction. For example,
West of England could not realistically instruct its members not to trade in Puerto Rico.
Such a burden would also effectively leave shipowners appointing ships as agents for
service of process.
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function of the due process doctrine-to protect defendants from being
hauled into forums with little or no relationship to the parties or the
action.
E. Necessity
It is often intimated, and sometimes stated explicitly, that a court
will not decline jurisdiction where no other United States forum exists
in which jurisdiction can be maintained against the defendant.8 3 Particularly in admiralty, it has been said that plaintiffs should not be
required to go abroad to obtain redress:
To compel suitors in admiralty when the ship is abroad and
cannot be reached by a libel in rem, to resort to the home of
the defendant, and to prevent them from suing him in any district in which he might be served with a summons or his goods
or credits attached, would not only often put them to great delay, inconvenience and expense, but would in many cases
amount to a denial of justice.5
53. See, e.g., McCreary, Going for the Jugular Vein: Arrests and Attachments in
Admiralty, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 19, 44 (1967) ("Where the identity of the responsible party is
unknown to the party wronged, or where the responsible party is known to reside overseas, the maritime remedies of arrest in rem or attachment in personam are indispensible means of redress in United States courts.") Id. See also 1979 A.M.C. at 1698, a case
in which the court noted the "difficulty of acquiring jurisdiction over foreigners" as one
justification for Rule C arrests. Id.
54. In re Louisville Underwriters, 134 U.S. 488, 493 (1890); Amoco Overseas Oil Co.
v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 605 F.2d 648, 655 (2d Cir. 1979);
Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Canadian Transp. Agencies, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 447, 453
(W.D. Wash. 1978). See also Bohmann, supra, note 5, at 148-49:
In admiralty actions.., the plaintiff's only alternative forum might be in a
foreign country. A foreign suit can cause considerable inconvenience, and the
judgment obtained would not be as readily enforceable in the United States as a
state court's judgment would be in a sister state. Moreover, depriving a plaintiff
of an in rem action might put the plaintiff at a disadvantage vis-a-vis claimants
in foreign countries. Foreign lienholders could execute their liens in in rem proceedings in foreign countries while United States claimants would be precluded
from instituting their own such suits in the United States. Thus, foreign
lienholders could protect their interests more easily than could domestic
lienholders.
Given such results, United States courts may determine that the United
States' interest in providing an admiralty forum outweighs a defendant vessel
owner's jurisdictional claims. Despite the language of Shaffer the courts may
find that this interest in providing a forum, where the failure to do so would
place the residents of this country at a disadvantage vis-a-vis residents of other
countries, is sufficient to supply the requisite contacts between the in rem litigation and the forum.
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This argument may be criticized on a number of grounds. First, as
discussed above, although admiralty jurisdiction and in rem procedures
are plaintiff-oriented in that they serve to increase the number of fora
available for suits in admiralty, due process protects defendants'
rights, and convenience to plaintiffs is of far less significance. Second,
the argument assumes a case of United States plaintiffs suing foreign
defendants, which is not always the situation 5 Third, and perhaps
most important, it ignores the extensive developments in the past forty
years in international commerce, communication and technology.
Moreover, these developments have been accompanied by an equally
extensive development in the jurisprudence of international commercial disputes, overturning parochial attitudes in favor of recognition
that many cases brought in the United States should actually proceed
Shaffer raised the possibility that jurisdiction by necessity, based on an in rem action against defendant's property, might satisfy due process: "This case does not raise,
and we therefore do not consider, the question whether the presence of a defendant's
property in a State is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when no other forum is available
to the plaintiff." 433 U.S. at 211 n.37 (1977). In Continental Grain, discussed supra at
text accompanying notes 35-40, the Court suggested that it approved of admiralty in rem
jurisdiction in cases in which the shipowner is not amenable to suit: "A purpose of the
[personification] fiction, among others, has been to allow action against ships where a
person owning the ship could not be reached, and it can be very useful for this purpose
still." 364 U.S. at 23. The issue in Continental Grain was whether admiralty in rem
jurisdiction which the Court viewed as a mechanism for increasing the number of fora
available to a plaintiff, should be "transferred into a weapon to defeat that very purpose." Id. The Court was faced with the choice of ignoring the fiction or else countenancing inconvenient and duplicative litigation, namely, an in rem action in one forum and
an identical in personam action in another. Given the options, it is not surprising that
the Court chose to set aside the fiction.
The Court's comment in Continental Grain concerning the utility of in rem jurisdiction when the ship owner cannot be reached, should be seen in light of the later development of Shaffer, when the Court made crystal clear its unwillingness to subject defendants to deprivation of their rights in the absence of minimum contacts. The Shaffer
court cited Continental Grain for the proposition that "an adverse judgment in rem
directly affects the property owner by divesting him of his rights in the property before
the court." 433 U.S. at 206. In the context of Shaffer, however, this statement means
more than it did in Continental Grain. It suggests that admiralty in rem actions are no
different from the civil actions to which "minimum contacts" doctrine must be applied.
Although there is no harm in looking at Rule C as a means of expanding the permissible
reach of United States courts, it must be remembered that the Due Process Clause protects the rights and convenience of defendants, not plaintiffs.
55. Plaintiffs in the following cases were foreign: Grand Bahama Pet Co., Ltd. v. Canadian Transp. Agencies, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. Wash. 1978); A/S Hjalmar
Bjorges Rederi v. Condor, 1979 A.M.C. 1696 (S.D. Cal. 1979); Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd., S.A.
v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1984); Ove Skou R/A v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 80
Civ. 6727 (LWP) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1981) (slip op.).
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elsewhere. 56 The court in the Nordic Regent stated it best:
In an era of increasing international commerce, parties who
choose to engage in international transactions should know
that when their foreign operations lead to litigation they cannot expect always to bring their foreign opponents into a
United States forum when every reasonable consideration leads
to the conclusion that the site of the litigation should be
5
elsewhere. 7
56. See, e.g., Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (dismissal of in rem
admiralty action brought by a United States plaintiff against a vessel by virtue of the
forum selection clause in an underlying contract directing parties to litigate in United
Kingdom); Alcoa S.S. Co., Inc. v. MNV Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1980) (en
banc) (dismissal of an admiralty action by a United States plaintiff against a shipowner
on grounds of forum non conveniens).
57. 654 F.2d at 156, quoting Mizokami Bros. of Ariz., Inc. v. Baychem Corp., 556 F.2d
975 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
Some parochial attitudes, however, may remain. In Louring v. Kuwait Boulder Shipping Co., 455 F. Supp. 630 (D. Conn. 1977), a United States plaintiff attached the debt of
a Connecticut corporation to the Kuwaiti defendant, relying on the Connecticut attachment statute. A Shaffer objection was raised, and the court upheld personal jurisdiction,
even though it conceded that minimum contacts under InternationalShoe might have
been lacking:
The Supreme Court's opinion in Shaffer explicitly left open the question
whether the presence of a defendant's property in a state is a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction "when no other forum is available to the plaintiff." Presumably, the
Court had in mind a case such as this, where the defendant is outside the territorial jurisdiction of any of the fifty states, in the sheikdom of Kuwait. While
Shaffer leaves the issue open, its rationale does not support application of a
minimum contacts test to a case such as this. The Court was persuaded to apply
the standards of InternationalShoe to quasi-in-rem jurisdiction in part because
an in personam judgment could be obtained "in a forum where the litigation can
be maintained consistently with InternationalShoe," and because the state in
which the property is located would then be obliged to honor such a judgment
under the full faith and credit clause. These arguments plainly contemplate a
defendant over whom in personam jurisdiction can be obtained in one of the
fifty states.
Id. at 633 (citations omitted). The court makes too much of Shaffer's reservation concerning jurisdiction by necessity. The "necessity" doctrine is somewhat parochial, as
noted above whenever it is applied, but it is particularly narrow when it is applied to a
case like Louring. In light of McGee, failure to meet the requirements of due process in
any state of the United States means that (1) defendant has too few contacts with any
state to satisfy InternationalShoe and (2) plaintiff's cause of action does not arise from
activities in or affecting any United States state. There is no reason in such a case-in
which the activities giving rise to the suit occurred abroad-for any plaintiff to expect a
United States forum. The existence of the forum non conveniens doctrine, far from supporting the exercise of jurisdiction, argues against such an exercise.
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Autonomy of Admiralty

A number of courts and commentators have concluded that due to
the particular requirements of admiralty, and the "autonomy" of admiralty over other types of jurisdiction, the exercise of personal jurisdiction in rem under Rule C is not subject to the due process strictures of
InternationalShoe." One argument is that admiralty jurisdiction has
a distinct basis in article III of the Constitution," giving constitutional
sanction to such procedures as in rem arrest which were in practice at
the time the Constitution was drafted and ratified.60 This argument
also stresses the long history of in rem arrests throughout American
history, and states that the courts have approved of such procedures
consistently."
58. See Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algeriene, 605 F.2d 648, 655
(2d Cir. 1979), in which the court stated: "[Slince the constitutional power of the federal
courts is separately derived in admiralty, U.S. Constitution Art. III § 2, suits under admiralty jurisdiction involve separate policies to some extent." See also Grand Bahama,
450 F. Supp. at 453.
The autonomy of admiralty from the common law is of constitutional magnitude.
The constitutional grant of judicial power conferred jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime matters independent of jurisdiction over matters in law and equity. This constitutional autonomy has been reaffirmed in recent times. See also A/S Hjalmar Bjorges Rederi v. Condor, 1979 A.M.C. 1696, 1698 (S.D. Cal. 1979) ("Admiralty's separation from
courts of law and equity is a constitutional distinction."); Schiffahrtsgesellschaft Leonhardt & Co. v. A. Bottacchi, 732 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1984) ("The framers considered admiralty jurisdiction so significant that they awarded Federal Courts the power to
sit in Admiralty under a separate constitutional delegation.") Id.
59. U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2, states:
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under
this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls: to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State;
between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State claiming
lands under grants of different States, and between a State, or the citizens
thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects.
Id. (emphasis added).
60. See, e.g., Grand Bahama, 450 F. Supp. at 452-55, citing Manro v. Almeida, 23
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 473 (1825).
61. See id. at 455, where Judge Beeks stated: "I am convinced that maritime attachment is constitutionally permissible. The recognized autonomy of admiralty jurisprudence, although not absolute, and the long constitutional viability of maritime attachment compel me to conclude that Shaffer does not reach Rule B(1) attachment." Id. see
also Sideris Shipping Co v. M/V Caribbean Arrow, 1980 A.M.C. 1296, 1298 (M.D. Fla.
1979).
See also Bottacchi, 732 F.2d at 1547:
The legacy of admiralty's legal heritage is the deep-rooted historical basis
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This argument is problematic for several reasons. First, the fact
that admiralty has a separate constitutional basis (as does diversity jurisdiction), does not mean that the exercise of that jurisdiction is not
subject to other constraints of the Constitution, especially due process.
Shaffer made no specific exception for admiralty cases, as was discussed above,6 2 and prima facie, all exercises of in rem jurisdiction
would be governed by the Shaffer analysis.63 The separate reference to
admiralty in Article III does not immunize a suit brought under that
heading from the restraints applicable to all other exercises of federal
64
jurisdiction.
surrounding its procedural rules. Maritime attachments, dating back to our nation's fledgling days, preceded the promulgation of specific admiralty rules. Congress authorized the Supreme Court to develop such rules in 1792. It reiterated
the peculiar nature of admiralty law and instructed adherence to rules and usages of admiralty rather than those of common law courts. Rule B is a sterling
example of the Court's respect for that advice. Its focus has changed little in 140
years. The practice was officially codified in 1844, and refined in 1920, as Admiralty Rule 2. With the addition of Admiralty procedure as supplemental rules to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it became Supplemental Rule B in 1966.
According to the Advisory Committee charged with unifying admiralty and civil
procedure, Rule B merely restates the traditional 19th Century attachment
method.
Id. See also Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie National Algerienne de Navigation,
459 F. Supp. 1242, 1249 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 605 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1979). ("Shaffer
does not destroy the venerable tradition of maritime action commenced quasi in rem.").
Bottacchi, Grand Bahama and Amoco were Rule B cases, but the reasoning concerning
admiralty's tradition is obviously applicable to Rule C as well.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
63. See Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Dredge General G.L. Gillespie, 663 F.2d 1338, 1353
(5th Cir. 1981) (Tate, J., dissenting) ("I can see no logical or pragmatic reason, nor any
based upon the [Supreme] Court's decisions in the area, why a uniform standard of procedural due process should not apply to all private litigants, whether in admiralty or
otherwise"). Id.
64. See Olsen, supra note 5, at 399 n.24:
At the time of the 1792 act (predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 1333 authorizing
admiralty jurisdiction), this country was comprised of people of numerous nationalities, e.g., French, English, Scots, Irish- each nationality having a different history and often radically different approaches to admiralty law. This country had been comprised of thirteen independent and sovereign states-each
having its own approach to admiralty law. Neither the United States Constitution nor the Act indicate which history and approach were intended to be incorporated in the words 'admiralty' and 'maritime.' Legislative history is also
murky on this point. Therefore, Justice Johnson's choice of the English history
and approach in Manro seems rather arbitrary.
Id.
Both GrandBahama and Condor cite Romero v. Int'l Term. Oper. Co., 358 U.S. 354
(1959), for the proposition that admiralty is constitutionally autonomous from other
Federal law. In Romero, a foreign seaman was injured in United States waters aboard a
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Second, the fact that a certain practice has a long history does not
make it constitutional. As the Due Process Doctrine has evolved, certain practices of the past are no longer permitted. A perfect example is
Pennoyer v. Neff, s6 which stood 100 years for the proposition that
quasi in rem jurisdiction could be based simply on the presence of defendant's property in the forum. Pennoyer, however, was overruled by
Shaffer."6 The exercise of admiralty jurisdiction, therefore, cannot be
removed from the Due Process Clause doctrine simply on a textual
basis.
Policy arguments are often made to the effect that "the unique
character and context of the maritime lien" justifies the use of Rule C
procedures without regard to the Due Process Clause. 67 This argument
stresses the transient nature of ships, the uncertainties of litigation in
foreign countries, and the reasonable expectation of maritime actors
that they will be sued wherever they are found.6"
This argument, too, is unpersuasive. Because the argument is
meant to justify a departure from due process rules applicable in practically every other type of proceeding, there is a substantial burden
imposed on those who would lessen due process protections in admiralty to show that such a lessening is necessary and fair. With respect
to necessity, clearly when the defendant and the controversy are so unconnected with the forum that InternationalShoe does not support an
assertion of jurisdiction, when the cause of action probably occurred
abroad, and when plaintiff himself may be a foreigner,6 9 there is no
foreign vessel, and sued, among others, the foreign shipowner. The Court held that maritime causes of action do not fall within the term "arising under the Constitution, [or]
laws of the United States" for purposes of Federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. The Court's analysis of article III was that because the Framers chose to set forth
two separate categories of cases of which Federal judicial power would extend, the categories could not be identical. See 358 U.S. at 361-68.
This analysis in Romero sheds no light on whether the Due Process Clause applies
to Rule C, unless one assumes one's conclusion. That is, unless it is assumed that the
Due Process Clause applies only to diversity, Federal question, and other heads of jurisdiction, the fact that admiralty is "autonomous," vis & vis those heads of jurisdiction, has
no significance. The mere fact that separate categories are set forth in article III does not
prove that Shaffer's broad language was not meant to apply to each category.
65. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
66. 433 U.S. at 212 & n.39 (1977).
67. See Merchants Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Dredge General G.L. Gillespie, 663 F.2d
1338, 1345-51 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 966 (1982).
68. Id. See also Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne, 605
F.2d 648, 655 (2d Cir. 1979); A/S Hjalmar Bjorges Rederi v. Condor, 1979 A.M.C. 1696,
1698 (S.D. Cal. 1979); Merchants Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Dredge General G.L. Gillespie,
663 F.2d at 1347.
69. See supra note 55.
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reason why a United States court should alter its constitutional analysis in order to provide jurisdiction in such a case.
70
Moreover, although maritime defendants may be "peripatetic,
71
plaintiffs are equally mobile, and as noted above, international transportation/communication is sufficiently sophisticated that international litigation is no longer as difficult or as uncertain as it once may
have been.
II. A

THEORY OF "AGGREGATE MINIMUM CONTACTS"

The discussion above presents arguments made by the courts and
other authorities both for and against the constitutionality of Rule C in
light of Supreme Court doctrine concerning the Due Process Clause.
The arguments on both sides are occasionally technical, and always
somewhat simplistic. They rarely address the fundamental issues in
analyzing jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. Although the
courts generally search for "minimum contacts" in order to satisfy concerns of due process, it must be remembered that this rather mechanical process is done in order to insure that fundamental fairness to defendants is respected. Such concerns for fairness do not recognize the
distinction between civil cases and admiralty cases. Nor do they acknowledge the distinction between an in rem action against a vessel
and an in personam action against its owner.
This is not to say, however, that those distinctions are completely
irrelevant. As the courts have noted, due process and fundamental fairness are flexible concepts,7 2 and must be adapted to the circumstances
of each case. What is unfair in one circumstance becomes fair in another. Thus, cases involving admiralty jurisdiction can be examined
under the standard announced in International Shoe without reference to legalistic notions such as personification, or by the simple assumption that civil due process principles have no application to
admiralty.
Certainly there is no requirement that a defendant have numerous
contacts with the jurisdiction in which he is sued. In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 7s the defendant insurance company simply
70. Amoco, 605 F.2d at 655; In re Louisville Underwriters, 134 U.S. 488, 493 (1890).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
72. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961) ("The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures
universally applicable to every imaginable situation. [citations omitted] "'[D]ue process," unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.' ", quoting with approval Joint Anti-Fascist
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
73. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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mailed a letter to the plaintiff in California. No other contacts were
alleged between defendant and the State of California. Nevertheless,
the Court held that it was fair to subject the defendant to jurisdiction
in the California court. Similarly, in the case of a vessel, it might be
to jurisdiction in any foconsidered fair for a shipowner to be subject
74
rum where his vessel might find itself.
In McGee, however, the cause of action arose from the single contact with the jurisdiction.75 This is not generally the case when a vessel
is sued in rem and arrested. Nevertheless, an intermediate standard of
contacts can be fashioned in the admiralty area which would satisfy
the fairness requirement, but not necessarily require the existence of
minimum contacts with a particular forum.
The proper approach is the "national aggregate contacts" theory.
Under this theory, when the action is based on federal substantive law
rather than state law, and when the defendant is a non-United States
entity, contacts for purposes of the Shaffer standard will be aggregated
76
from all of defendant's contacts with the United States as a whole.
Thus, a defendant, with otherwise insufficient contacts with the forum
state, will be subject to jurisdiction by virtue of its contacts there and
its aggregated contacts with the rest of the United States.
This theory has been applied in a number of circuits, primarily in
cases involving Federal securities, tax or other statutes.7 71 Ithas been
said, however, that the national aggregate contacts theory is a minority
one7 8 and, until very recently, it had not been used in admiralty
79

cases.

74. This, of course, is the logic of the "personification" doctrine. See generally supra
notes 17-40 and accompanying text.
75. 355 U.S. at 222-23.
76. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) and Cyromedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975).
77. See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1981) and Securities Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78u (1981 & Supp. 1985). These statutes provide specifically for extraterritorial
service of process, so that a non-United States entity that does not have an agent for
service in the United States may be served abroad.
78. See Superior Coal Co. v. Ruhrkohle, A.G., 83 F.R.D. 414 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
79. In Szabo v. Smedvig Tank-Rederi A.S., 95 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), and
Paragon Oil Co. v. Panama Ref. & Petrochem. Co., 192 F. Supp. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), the
courts applied a "minimum contacts" theory to satisfy any constitutional concerns, but
did not apply a "national contacts" theory to the due process question. Moreover, in
Scott v. Middle East Airlines Co., S.A., 240 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), the court specifically rejected "national contacts" as a substitute for minimum contacts with the forum
state. The court concluded:
[Iln order to acquire jurisdiction over the respondent it must be found that the
respondent has sufficient ties not merely with the United States but with the
state of the forum to make jurisdicition over it consistent with "our traditional
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In Engineering Equipment Co. v. S.S. Selene,80 the plaintiffs
claim was for cargo misdelivery and damage arising out of a voyage
that commenced in Philadelphia. Suit was brought in New York
against the shipowner, and an attachment was attempted under Rule
B(1) against the charter hire due to the owner from its agents in New
York."1 The shipowner claimed to have no contacts with New York
under Shaffer, but the court held that contacts with the United States
as a whole were sufficient to satisfy the "national contacts" test:
The constitutionality of this act of Congress [Rule B(1)] must
be tested under the standards of the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment, not those of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The defendants' contacts with the forum state are quite beside
the point under the Fifth Amendment. The relevant constitutional inquiry under the Fifth Amendment is whether the defendants have minimum contacts with the United States as a
whole sufficient to make our assertion of jurisdiction fair and
reasonable under the circumstances. There can be no doubt
that the contacts between the defendants, their property and
the United States are sufficient to permit us to assume
8 2
jurisdiction.
conception of fair play and substantial justice." [InternationalShoe]. There is,
furthermore, an additional reason for not abandoning this test here. MEA [Middle East Airlines] is a Lebanese corporation and, unlike an American corporation, there is the possibility that it is not "present" in the United States at all.
Thus, it is not simply a question of in which state shall the respondent be sued
but whether it should be sued in the United States at all. In such a case there
should certainly be required a finding that MEA has the necessary contacts with
the United States to allow suit and, for the reasons noted, with New York as
well.
Id. at 4. The above reasoning, of course, is contrary to that in one of the earlier cases, in
which the question of "jurisdiction by necessity" influenced the admiralty court in deciding to retain jurisdiction of the matter. See Amoco, 605 F.2d at 655. In Scott, the court
apparently felt that the defendant's lack of contacts with the United States should be
looked at in a manner favorable to dismissal.
80. 446 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
81. It does not appear that the agents were physically located in New York, because,
had this been the case, the court would probably have mentioned it. The agents, however, submitted to New York jurisdiction, and the court ruled that "Since the ...
garnishees are subject to our in personam jurisdiction, the debts are deemed to have their
situs within the district." Id. at 708-09.
82. Id. at 709-10. This reasoning is perhaps more complex than it appears to be. Because Rule B(1) requires that "the defendant shall not be found within the district," the
effect of "finding" minimum contacts should be to invalidate an attachment based on
Rule B(1). In personam jurisdiction would exist in such a case. See Olsen, supra note 5,
at 413: "Requiring a defendant's absence for one purpose (Rule B attachment) and presence for another (minimum contacts for jurisdiction) is plainly untenable, if not
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More recently, the First Circuit applied a "national contacts"
analysis in an admiralty attachment case. Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. S.A.
v. Apex Oil Co.,83 involved a Missouri corporation whose debt in Puerto Rico was attached by a Panamanian corporation under Rule B in
an action to recover demurrage. The defendant raised Shaffer as a
ground for vacating the attachment, contending that it lacked minimum contacts with Puerto Rico.
The district court upheld the attachment, 4 and the First Circuit
affirmed. With deference to Shaffer, the court quoted World-Wide
Volkswagen with respect to the functions of the "minimum contacts"
test:
The concept of minimum contacts. . . can be seen to perform
two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant [from] litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.
And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do
not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.8 5
The court noted that the second of these functions was inapplicable in
an admiralty case, because "[flederal jurisdiction being national in
scope, due process only requires sufficient contacts within the United
States as a whole. ''8 Since defendant was a United States corporation
headquartered in Missouri, it had sufficient contact with the United
States to satisfy the "sovereignty" purpose of minimum contacts.
With respect to the policy of protecting defendants from suits in
inconvenient fora, the court noted that the doctrines of forum non conschizophrenic."
The court in Selene did not acknowledge this paradox for the simple reason that in
theory none exists. So long as "national contacts" is the applicable standard, a defendant
may satisfy that due process jurisdictional standard without having sufficient contacts
with the forum to constitute "presence" there for B(1) purposes. The shipowner in Selene provides an example of just a situation. See also LaBanca v. Ostermunchner, 664
F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1981), a case in which a B(1) attachment was upheld against a defendant with "minimum contacts" because service within the district was impossible.
The Rule C problem case, of course, arises out of a "dearth" of contacts, not a "surfeit." That is to say, Rule C is applied unconstitutionally only when even a vessel's physical presence in the forum is insufficient to satisfy Shaffer. Selene, however, warns us
that where the defendant has too many contacts with the forum, in personam jurisdiction may make Rule B(1) attachment unavailable.
83. 743 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1984).
84. 604 F. Supp. 4 (D.P.R. 1983).
85. Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. S.A. v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir. 1984),
quoting World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291-92 (1980).
86. Trans-Asiatic Oil, 743 F.2d at 959.
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veniens and change of venue were always available.8 7 In addition, however, the court invoked the InternationalShoe standard of "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice," and held, first, that admiralty plaintiffs should be able to bring suit wherever defendants' goods/
credits are found, and second, that admiralty defendants may expect to
be sued in all such fora. 8 Thus, the court concluded that the exercise
of personal jurisdiction against the defendant was not improper.
The court reached the right result but for the wrong reasons. As
discussed earlier, InternationalShoe and Shaffer do not protect plaintiffs, but rather ensure that defendants' due process rights are protected.8 9 Any suggestion to the contrary in Trans-Asiatic is most certainly incorrect. With respect to the so-called "need for special
procedures" in admiralty, the court falls into the same trap as did the
courts in Grand Bahama and other cases. Moreover, the need to protect plaintiffs from having to litigate in inconvenient fora is not strong
where the plaintiff is not American but Panamanian, as was the plaintiff in Trans-Asiatic.
Trans-Asiatic's application of the "national contacts" analysis,
though perhaps unnecessary, was certainly proper and correct even
though defendant was a United States corporation. Although the national contacts doctrine usually presumes a foreign defendant, there is
no reason why a distinction should be made on that basis. The arguments in favor of "national contacts" as an approach to Rule C arrests
are, therefore, equally applicable, and defendant's contacts with the
United States made the assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction in TransAsiatic reasonable.
There are, therefore, two significant precedents in admiralty for
the application of the "national contacts" theory. The theory is the
only mechanism for dealing with due process problems where a defendant has too few contacts with any one forum to satisfy the state-court
jurisdictional standards set forth in International Shoe, Shaffer and
McGee.
A vessel (and owner) with no prior contacts with the United States
should not be subject to in rem or in personam jurisdiction as a result
87. Id.
88. Id. at 960.
89. See generally supra text accompanying note 55. Cf. Grand Bahama, 450 F. Supp.
at 458, quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972): "Procedural due process is
not intended to promote efficiency or accommodate all possible interests: it is intended
to protect the particular interests of the person whose possessions are about to be
taken." Id. Although Grand Bahama applied this statement to the validity of Rule B
attachment under Sniadach, the statement could equally be applied to Rule C arrests
under Shaffer.
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of the first contact, unless, of course, the cause of action arises from
0
that contact.9
If, however, the vessel or owner had had prior contacts
with other fora in the United States, it certainly could be argued that
suit in the United States was not completely unforeseeable from the
perspective of the owner."1 Because in rem arrest actions under Rule C
require the presence of the vessel within the jurisdiction of the district
court," there is no danger of jurisdiction being sought in a distant
state with which the owner has no contacts whatsoever. In other words,
only the ports of the United States that handle international commerce-and to which the vessel has called-can host such lawsuits. A
transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is even available when convenience
of parties or witnesses warrants such transfer. 3 Thus, the application
of a "national aggregate contacts" theory would seem to be quite appropriate in Rule C cases.
90. Thus, in the hypothetical set out above, the arrest in rem and action in personam
would be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
In Witham v. The James E. McAlpine, 96 F. Supp. 723 (E.D. Mich. 1951), a vessel
en route from Superior, Wisconsin to Buffalo, New York was boarded by a United States
Deputy Marshal as she was abeam of St. Clair, Michigan, and was served with an arrest
warrant and required to proceed to a dock in Detroit. St. Clair and the waters adjacent
thereto are within the boundaries of the Eastern District of Michigan. The court sustained the arrest, finding that the shipowner did business in Michigan, based on the
regular purchase of bunkers and other supplies, and the hiring of crew, in the state. Id.
at 728. Although the court did not cite InternationalShoe, its holding would no doubt
survive the application of Shaffer's due process analysis.
91. Application of "national contacts" in an in personam admiralty case is illustrated
by Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973). Plaintiff sued the
owner of a cruise line (NCL) for the death of his wife while both were on a Caribbean
cruise aboard defendant's vessel. The court analyzed NCL's contacts with Michigan
(plaintiff's residence) and found them insufficient under InternationalShoe. Id. at 358
n.5. The court, however, turning to NCL's contacts with other states, found that NCL
derived 42% of its passenger traffic from Florida, had branch offices in Miami, New
York, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, and Los Angeles, and had other contacts with the
United States as well. Id. at 358. The court concluded that "[tiaken as a whole, defendant's contacts with the United States, both qualitatively and quantitatively, are constitutionally sufficient to enable this court to render a binding judgment against it." Id. The
court then granted NCL's motion to transfer the case to the Southern District of Florida.
The difficulty here is that maritime liens may be asserted against a vessel even after
ownership of the vessel has passed to a third party without knowledge of the lien's existence. See GILMORE & BLACK. supra note 13, § 9-5 to § 9-8, 594-97. Here, it must be said
that no real due process problem arises, because the defendant shipowner's contacts are
still the operative factor.
92. See Rule C, supra note 1.
93. An in rem action may be transferred along with an in personam action even if the
vessel was not in the transferee forum, and, thus, could not have been sued there. Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26 (1959).
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CONCLUSION

Any owner who does not satisfy a "national aggregate contacts"
standard should not fairly be subject to jurisdiction in the United
States. Conversely, an owner who does satisfy the standard, as it has
been developed through Shaffer and its progeny," can fairly be so
subjected.
Perhaps the main thread in the arguments opposing the application of Shaffer to Rule C proceedings is that it is somehow essential
that the admiralty arrest procedure be kept as free from constraint as
possible for the protection of maritime lienors.1" Clearly, there is an
intent among courts and commentators to ensure that United States
courts are always available to both United States and foreign creditors
who have liens against vessels which call in the United States." Some
of the justifications offered for this view have been presented above,
but one which appears more often than any other is that in some way a
plaintiff would be deprived of justice or remedy if not allowed to arrest
(or attach) property in the United States. This point was offered eloquently by the court in Schiffahrtsgesellshaft v. Bottachi,7 as follows:
"'A ship may be here today and gone tomorrow . . . .' Worse yet, as
the ship sails, so does the debtor. The frustrated creditor, much like
Evangeline, the poor Acadian girl separated from her lover, is tragically
left to roam the shores awaiting the debtor's next arrival." ' The suggestion is that by applying Due Process Clause doctrine to admiralty
proceedings the value of United States courts would diminish to the
international maritime community.
94. See supra note 46 for a discussion of Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
95. See, e.g., Schiffahrtsgesellschaft Leonhardt & Co. v. A. Bottacchi, 732 F.2d 1543,
1547 (11th Cir. 1984) in which the court stated: "Traditional procedural due process
analysis does not take place in a vacuum; relevant commercial and legal considerations
provide the backdrop for review . . . ."Id.
"In this atmosphere, Rule B restores order and attempts to protect the creditor's
rights. It draws debtors from otherwise inpenetrable fortresses .... Otherwise, pursuit
of such unresolvable disputes, as the Court long ago acknowledged, 'would in many cases
amount to a denial of justice.'" Id. at 1548 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
Although Bottacchi was concerned with Sniadach objections to Rule B, the reasoning
has been applied to Shaffer analysis of Rule C as well. See A/S Hjalmar Bjorges Rederi
v. Condor, 1979 A.M.C. 1696, 1698 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
96. See, e.g., Bohmann, supra note 5, at 149: "[Clourts may conclude that in admiralty actions in rem, where the existence of a maritime lien provides contacts between
the defendant and the litigation, the country's general interest in providing a forum for
maritime disputes constitutes the requisite connection between the forum and the litigation." Id.
97. 732 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
98. Id. at 1547-48.
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This argument overstates the importance of United States courts
as sites for maritime litigation. In rem actions against vessels are available in courts throughout the world to enforce maritime liens.9 9 Even if
such extraneous circumstances were constitutionally relevant, however,
there are no grounds for saying, as did the court in Bottacchi, that
"foibtaining jurisdiction over Bottacchi [in Georgia] is appellant's only
means of enforcing these two contractual provisions [in the charter
party]."°°
In Bottacchi, plaintiff was a German corporation which owned vessels, and Bottacchi was an Argentine corporation which also owned
vessels.10 1 It makes no sense to argue that the United States is an essential forum for litigation between a German and an Argentine. 102 The
admiralty tradition, such as it is, is honored in the fact that 28 U.S.C. §
1333 permits foreigners to sue other foreigners in United States Federal courts on admiralty claims, subject only to the requirement that
personal jurisdiction be obtained over the defendant. This jurisdictional requirement does not force a major change in admiralty practice
in the United States. It simply says that the Due Process Clause is
applicable to all forms of jurisdiction, in accordance with the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
The argument also ignores the existence of in personam remedies
against the shipowners. Except in rare instances as noted above, 0 3
wherever there is an in rem liability of the vessel, there is also an in
personam liability of her owner. If the vessel leaves the jurisdiction,
never to return, the owner may still do business in the United States,
and be amenable to service of an in personam complaint. In addition,
as stated earlier, where the owner has so few contacts with the United
States as not to satisfy even the aggregate 'contact standard, it is most
unlikely that the cause of action (or the plaintiff) has any connection
with the United States whatsoever.'" Although the argument has been
made that looking to the owner's contacts will simply lead to "intricate
corporate shells . . . employed to disguise the ownership of shipping
99. See, e.g., International Convention Relating to the Arrest of Sea-Going Ships,
May 10, 1952, 439 U.N.T.S. 193. The United States is not a party to this Convention, but
a great many foreign states are.
100. Bottacchi, 732 F.2d at 1544.
101. Id.
102. This, of course, is especially true when, as in Bottacchi, the cause of action
arises out of events entirely unconnected with the United States, between parties whose
international operations cause them to have agents (and attorneys) throughout the
world. Id.
103. See supra note 28.
104. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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assets,"10 5 the question remains whether the party who has wronged
the plaintiff, so as to give plaintiff a lien on the vessel, is present in the
jurisdiction. Courts have long ago learned to deal with the peculiar
problems of unraveling shipowning corporations.
It is uncertain whether Rule C must be amended to incorporate
the "aggregate contacts" approach to Shaffer. Some courts that have
declined to adopt the aggregate contacts rationale in other, non-maritime contexts have stated that they declined solely because the principle has not been incorporated into the Federal Rules or Federal jurisdictional statutes.106 These courts would appear to be more concerned
with service of process than amenability to suit, because there have
never been federal rules or statutes governing the nature of minimum
contacts required for jurisdiction.10 Service is not a problem in the
Rule C context, however, since service is on the vessel, which must be
in the district.108 There is no difficulty with the courts, as those in
Trans-Asiatic and Selene, applying "aggregate contacts" without specific congressional authority. The interpretation of due process standards in this area, therefore, is a subject for judicial analysis, not legislative action.

105. Cf. Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. S.A. v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956, 960 (1st Cir. 1984),
quoting Bottacchi, 732 F.2d at 1548.
106. See, e.g., Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 1985)
("We are ... unaware of any Federal statute which presently authorizes district courts
to [find] personal jurisdiction upon such aggregated contacts."); Edward J. Moriarty &
Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381, 390 (S.D. Ohio 1967) ("Unfortunately, this course has not been left open to us by the Federal rules or statutes"); Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659, 664 (D.N.H. 1977)
("Congress could well have passed statute stating that jurisdiction over aliens will be
based on their contacts with the nation as a whole . . ."); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells
Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 418 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[Tihe Federal Rules should be
amended to authorize such a practice. Such a step is, however, not ours to take.").
107. See, e.g., Clayton Act, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1981 & Supp. 1985) (authorizing
service on a corporation "wherever it may be found"). In General Elec. Co. v. BucyrusErie Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), the court construed that provision as authorizing assertion of "personal jurisdiction over foreigners not present in the United
States to but, of course, not beyond the bounds permitted by the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 1043. The court applied "national aggregate contacts" theory, but did so by virtue of its own interpretation of the Due Process Clause, not on the
basis of any statute.
108. FED. R. Civ. P. E(3)(a): "Process in rem and of maritime attachment and garnishment shall be served only within the district."

